DNS Rebinding #
DNS rebinding changes the IP address of an attacker controlled machine name to the IP address of a target application, bypassing the same-origin policy and thus allowing the browser to make arbitrary requests to the target application and read their responses.
- Singularity of Origin - is a tool to perform DNS rebinding attacks.
- Singularity of Origin Web Client (manager interface, port scanner and autoattack)
First, we need to make sure that the targeted service is vulnerable to DNS rebinding. It can be done with a simple curl request:
curl --header 'Host: <arbitrary-hostname>' http://<vulnerable-service>:8080
If the server returns the expected result (e.g. the regular web page) then the service is vulnerable. If the server returns an error message (e.g. 404 or similar), the server has most likely protections implemented which prevent DNS rebinding attacks.
Then, if the service is vulnerable, we can abuse DNS rebinding by following these steps:
- Register a domain.
- Setup Singularity of Origin.
- Edit the autoattack HTML page for your needs.
- Browse to “http://rebinder.your.domain:8080/autoattack.html".
- Wait for the attack to finish (it can take few seconds/minutes).
Protection Bypasses #
Most DNS protections are implemented in the form of blocking DNS responses containing unwanted IP addresses at the perimeter, when DNS responses enter the internal network. The most common form of protection is to block private IP addresses as defined in RFC 1918 (i.e. 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16). Some tools allow to additionally block localhost (127.0.0.0/8), local (internal) networks, or 0.0.0.0/0 network ranges. In the case where DNS protection are enabled (generally disabled by default), NCC Group has documented multiple DNS protection bypasses that can be used.
We can use the IP address 0.0.0.0 to access the localhost (127.0.0.1) to bypass filters blocking DNS responses containing 127.0.0.1 or 127.0.0.0/8.
We can use DNS CNAME records to bypass a DNS protection solution that blocks all internal IP addresses. Since our response will only return a CNAME of an internal server, the rule filtering internal IP addresses will not be applied. Then, the local, internal DNS server will resolve the CNAME.
$ dig cname.example.com +noall +answer ; <<>> DiG 9.11.3-1ubuntu1.15-Ubuntu <<>> example.com +noall +answer ;; global options: +cmd cname.example.com. 381 IN CNAME target.local.
We can use “localhost” as a DNS CNAME record to bypass filters blocking DNS responses containing 127.0.0.1.
$ dig www.example.com +noall +answer ; <<>> DiG 9.11.3-1ubuntu1.15-Ubuntu <<>> example.com +noall +answer ;; global options: +cmd localhost.example.com. 381 IN CNAME localhost.
- Hacking Docker Remotely - 17 March 2020 - ch0ks
- Understanding Docker container escapes - JULY 19, 2019 - Trail of Bits
- Capturing all the flags in BSidesSF CTF by pwning our infrastructure - Hackernoon
- Breaking out of Docker via runC – Explaining CVE-2019-5736 - Yuval Avrahami - February 21, 2019
- CVE-2019-5736: Escape from Docker and Kubernetes containers to root on host - dragonsector.pl
- OWASP - Docker Security CheatSheet
- Anatomy of a hack: Docker Registry - NotSoSecure - April 6, 2017
- Linux Kernel Hacking 3.8: Privileged Container Escapes - Harvey Phillips @xcellerator